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Abstract
Wireless networking technologies based on IEEE 802.11 series of standards are evolving to address
many of the security issues that plagued earlier wireless standards. Unfortunately the current standards
fail to authenticate management frames and network card addresses, and rely on loosely coupled state
machines. This results in serious vulnerabilities that may lead to denial of service, session hijacking,
and address masquerading attacks. Until the standards are updated to redress these problems, wireless
network deployments must be supported by wireless intrusion detection systems–a challenging and under
researched area. This paper presents techniques for improving detection of session hijacking attacks that
are passive, computationally inexpensive, reliable, and have minimal impact on network performance.
Experimental results are presented to give confidence in the utility of the techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless intrusion detection is a challenging research area that is considerably different to, and
much less understood than, intrusion detection in wired networks (in this paper the terms Wireless
and Wireless Local Area Networks refer to IEEE 802.11 infrastructure networks [6]). The first
challenge facing Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDSs) is the broadcast nature of the
physical (PHY) layer, which makes passive access to the medium a trivial undertaking. Sec-
ondly, the limited bandwidth available to wireless physical layers imposes significant efficiency
restrictions on intrusion detection techniques. Finally, a wireless network typically consists of
mobile client stations like laptops and handheld computers which have limited battery life and
computing resources, introducing further constraints on the techniques that may be adopted by
a WIDS.
The additional constraints imposed by the wireless environment require that the WIDS not
only meet the desirable characteristics of wired IDS, such as a low rate of false positives, but
that it must also meet the computational and bandwidth constraints of the wireless environment
through the adoption of efficient detection techniques. Unlike wired intrusion detection systems,
a WIDS must also operate to detect and defend against intrusions at the lower PHY and media
access control (MAC) layers of the protocol stack. Effective response to intrusions at lower layers
in the protocol stack requires a realtime monitoring capability, combined with a high level of
confidence in the intrusion alerts. While the range of threats to wireless networks are broad [12],
this paper is specifically interested in the reliable detection of session hijacking attacks using
passive techniques.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows, the next section reviews the current state
of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) security in general and session hijacking attacks
specifically. Section III reviews the current approaches to wireless intrusion detection and the
limitations of these approaches are discussed in Section IV. In Section V, we present desirable
characteristics of an ideal WIDS. A new approach to passively detect session hijacking attacks,
that achieves the efficiency and effectiveness goals of WIDS is presented in Section VI with
supporting experimental results. Conclusions and future directions for research are presented in
Section VII.
II. SECURITY IN IEEE 802.11 WLANS
WLAN security has been under extensive scrutiny in the last few years and has received due
attention from both academic and industrial sectors. However, despite the emergence of security
standards like IEEE 802.11i [7] that improve the confidentiality and integrity protection of user
data, WLANs still face a variety of serious threats and risks. These remaining threats are based
on: (1) failure to adequately protect management frames used by the IEEE 802.11 state machine;
(2) loose coupling between the state machines used by IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.1X; and (3)
vulnerabilities in supporting protocols, such as extensible authentication protocol (EAP) and key
management protocols [4], [9].
A. Unauthenticated Management Frames
Management frames are MAC frames used in IEEE 802.11 WLANs to manage the association
between a wireless station (STA) and an access point (AP) in infrastructure mode. The exchange
of management frames moves a STA from the unassociated and unauthenticated state, to the
associated and authenticated state. Once in the associated and authenticated state, the STA is able
to transmit and receive data. Neither the original IEEE 802.11 standards, nor the recent IEEE
802.11i standard specify mechanisms for protecting the integrity of management frames, leaving
IEEE 802.11 based WLANs vulnerable to management frame spoofing and the associated denial
of service attacks that such spoofing permits [2].
B. Loosely Coupled State Machines
IEEE 802.11i has resulted in addition of a fourth state to the classical IEEE 802.11 state
machine i.e. Robust Secure Network(RSN) associated - state 4, hence making it the RSN state
machine [9]. IEEE 802.11i specifies the use of port-based network access control (IEEE 802.1X)
and EAP for the authentication of STAs wishing to associate to an AP [7].
This higher layer authentication using EAP only occurs when the STA is in state 4. The
combined output of RSN state machine and IEEE 802.1X state machine dictates the STA’s
authentication status. However the coupling between the RSN state machine and IEEE 802.1X
state machine is loose and can be easily exploited for session hijacking attacks.
C. Session Hijacking in IEEE 802.11 WLANs
Session hijacking is a common and serious threat to WLAN security that exploits deficiencies
in the WLAN security state machine and can be launched using off-the-shelf hardware and
software. Session hijacking combines denial of service and identity spoofing attacks. Typically
an adversary forces a legitimate STA to terminate its connection to an AP by sending it a
disassociation/deauthentication management frame with the source MAC address spoofed to be
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that of the AP. This results in the STA disconnecting from the network. The adversary can now
associate with the AP, by masquerading the MAC address of the STA, and hence taking over
its session. The adversary can periodically spoof management frames to the legitimate STA to
stop it from even retrying association with its AP.
In an IEEE 802.11i session hijacking attack, a legitimate STA successfully authenticates itself
to an AP via both IEEE 802.1X and Open Authentication [6] steps. Now the attacker sends a
disassociation management frame to the STA with the source MAC address spoofed to be that
of the AP. After receiving this message, the legitimate STA terminates its connection to the
AP. However on the AP, only the RSN state machine transitions to unassociated state, while
the AP’s IEEE 802.1X state machine still remains in authenticated state. The attacker is then
able to gain access to the network by spoofing the MAC address of the legitimate STA. As the
IEEE 802.1X state machine of the AP still considers the STA to be in authenticated state [9]
the attacker is considered to be associated and authenticated.
D. Summary
Session hijacking attacks are possible in 802.11i wireless LANs due to the use of unauthen-
ticated management frames and the loose coupling of the 802.11i and 802.1X state machines.
Until the standards are updated to include techniques to adequately address session hijacking
attacks, specialized WIDS will be required to help manage these risks by detecting attacks in a
reliable fashion.
III. RELATED WORK
Despite the wide popularity of WLANs, research into WLAN intrusion detection techniques
has been limited. Most work concentrates on overall WIDS architecture rather than on the
quality of the detection techniques employed. Significantly, there are few techniques available
for detecting session hijacking attacks that are reliable and effective.
Existing approaches for detecting session hijacking attacks include the monitoring of MAC
frame sequence numbers [11], [13], with dramatic changes in sequence numbers indicative of
an intrusion; MAC address authentication against lists of valid users and valid wireless network
card vendors [3], [5], [16], or some combination of the two [8]. Monitoring of received signal
strength measurements has also been proposed [8] to permit the detection of signals that may
be emanating from unauthorised locations.
Numerous open source WIDS prototypes have been developed, notably Snort-Wireless1 and
WIDZ 2. Snort-Wireless is capable of detecting rogue APs and STAs, deauthentication and
disassociation flood attacks, session hijacking attacks and war driving detection. Rogue detection
is based on a list of authorized MAC addresses maintained in a configuration file and the deau-
thentication/disassociation flooding detection is based on monitoring for frames with subtypes of
deauthentication/disassociation combined with a broadcast target MAC address. While the session
hijacking attack detection is based on monitoring for inconsistencies in MAC frame sequence
numbers [13]. WIDZ’s functionality and techniques are similar to those of Snort-Wireless.
1http://snort-wireless.org
2http://www.loud-fat-bloke.co.uk/w80211.html
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IV. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
The techniques used by research and open source WIDS mentioned in section III are not very
robust and work in isolation from each other. The intrusion alerts produced by these systems
can not be acted upon with high confidence. Detection of unauthorized STAs and APs is based
on their MAC addresses, which can easily be masqueraded. Session hijacking attacks, which are
usually executed as a combination of identity spoofing and denial of service attacks, can not be
detected very reliably by current systems.
For detecting session hijacking and spoofing attacks, the only mechanism used is based on
detecting abnormal jump in sequence numbering of IEEE 802.11 frames or checking if the MAC
address belongs to a well known manufacturer. But neither is a very good indicator of a session
hijacking or spoofing attack as the sequence numbers range only from 0 to 4096 and gets reset
everytime the station restarts and the MAC addresses can easily be masqueraded. The sequence
numbers are predictable and are not cryptographically protected, so can easily be eavesdropped.
With knowledge of the sequence numbers used currently by the STA, the adversary can easily
spoof the STA’s MAC address and inject frames with the sequence numbers next in sequence
for the STA [13].
Detection of denial of service attacks is also based on detecting management frames like
deauthentication and disassociation with a broadcast destination address. But this does not catch
the targeted denial of service attacks or session hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks where
the adversary forces a valid STA to disconnect from its associated AP and then associates itself
to the AP spoofing the valid STA’s identity (MAC address). In a man-in-the-middle attack, the
adversary further presents itself as the valid AP (by spoofing the valid AP’s MAC address)
on a different channel to the valid STA, who readily connects to the adversary’s AP. Now the
adversary can see all traffic passing between the valid AP and the valid STA. Systems like [8]
that use signal strength to detect location of a wireless node can easily be defeated by using a
high gain directional antennas. An adversary at a far away location can boost the signal strength
and effectively spoof his/her location.
V. DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR SESSION HIJACKING DETECTION
Current techniques for detecting session hijacking attacks are ineffective as they are based on
spoofable and predictable parameters such as MAC addresses and sequence numbers. Ideally
a WIDS should utilise unspoofable characteristics from the MAC protocol and the physical
layer to enhance confidence in intrusion decisions. The characteristics should be computationally
inexpensive to calculate allowing them to be determined in a fast and efficient manner.
The WIDS should operate in realtime in a passive fashion and not require modification to
the standards, wireless card drivers, or client operating system or software. The WIDS should
operate, without causing any interference to the live traffic or network performance.
As with all IDSs a WIDS should maintain a minimum level of false positives and negatives.
An approach based on co-operating detection techniques can increase confidence in the validity
of intrusion alerts.
VI. PASSIVE DETECTION OF SESSION HIJACKING
In this section of the paper we present two techniques that can be used by a WIDS to
passively detect session hijacking attacks. The techniques described meet many of the desirable
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characteristics proposed as they: are based on unspoofable characteristics of the PHY and MAC
layers of the IEEE 802.11 standard; are passive and do not require modifications to the standard,
wireless card drivers, operating system or client software; are computationally inexpensive; and
do not interfere with live traffic or network performance.
A. Monitoring Received Signal Strength (RSS)
Received signal strength (RSS) is a measure of the energy observed by the physical layer at
the antenna of a receiver. In IEEE 802.11 networks the RSS indication (RSSI) value is used when
performing medium access control clear channel assessments and in roaming operations. The
radio frequency (RF) signal strength can be measured in either an absolute (decibel milliwatts -
dBm), or relative (RSSI) manner.
The strength of RF signals undergoes some attenuation during transmission after leaving the
sender’s radio and this signal strength deterioration is governed by a variety of factors like RF
interferences, distance between communicating nodes, obstacles etc. The distance between the
two nodes has the biggest impact on signal fading. However RF signal strength does not fade in
a linear manner, rather it attenuates roughly inversely as the square of the distance between the
two nodes [1]. Along with distance, the RSS for a particular node, as observed by the receiver,
also depends on various other factors like the WLAN equipment used by both the sender and
the receiver nodes, the physical obstacles in between and their surrounding environment. The
mathematical path loss model for IEEE 802.11 RF waves as used by Wullems et. al. [15] also
suggests direct relationship between the received signal strength and distance between the sender
and the receiver along with numerous other factors, including: frequency used; antenna gain;
and an environmental coefficient.
As is clear from the discussion above, it is not possible for an adversary to accurately guess
RSS for a sender as perceived by a receiver. The adversary will need to be at exactly the same
location as the receiver, use exactly the same radio equipment, receive the radio signal with
same level of interference, reflections and refractions to know the exact RSS value as perceived
by the receiver. Even if the sender is stationary, RSS values tend to slightly fluctuate and hence
prove almost impossible to guess. This prohibits the adversary from using radio equipment (like
a high gain directional antenna) to spoof the RSS as perceived by the receiver.
1) Discussion: From an intrusion detection perspective, this property is valuable as it is
unspoofable and computationally inexpensive to measure. As it is calculated at the receiver,
it is secure from eavesdropping. We propose that by periodically monitoring the RSS values
for a particular STA or an AP from a passive monitor we can develop a dynamic profile for
the communicating nodes based on their RSS values. Any abrupt or unusual changes can be
flagged as suspicious activity indicative of a potential session hijacking attack. The RSS profile
is dynamic in the sense that it is rebuilt for every session between two nodes and is constantly
updated with new observed RSS values for each node per session. Since APs are generally
stationary, any abrupt changes in their RSS dynamic profile can probably be flagged as suspicious
activity with a higher confidence level. However, if the STA is mobile then its corresponding
RSS values will change more rapidly as observed by the monitor. The uncertainty of the wireless
medium thus can be used in favour of intrusion detection, where the adversary has no means of
knowing what RSS values to spoof. Hence it proves effective against both insider and outsider
session hijacking attacks and requires no additional bandwidth consumption. Although RSS
monitoring is not a novel idea, however its application has been largely limited to location
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determination [15]. As far as we are aware, ours is the first attempt to apply RSS monitoring to
intrusion detection.
For example if a legitimate STA A has an active session with an AP B, the passive monitor
can build a dynamic RSS profile for both A and B based on their observed RSS values at the
monitor. If an attacker mobile station C hijacks A’s session by forcing it off the network and
spoofing its MAC address, the monitor will pick up the sudden change in RSS profile of A’s
MAC address and raise an alert. RSS values for A’s MAC address will change as they depend
on C’s actual location, radio equipment and surrounding environment.
In another scenario, if the attacker C tries to spoof as the access point B, it will also get
detected as the dynamic RSS profile for the AP will undergo abrupt fluctuations. This mechanism
therefore provides detection for both session hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks directed
at either STAs or APs.
(a) Received Signal Strength (RSS) (b) Round Trip Time (RTT)
Fig. 1. Passive monitoring of RSS and RTT for intrusion detection
As we are only interested in the changes between periodic RSS measurements and not their
absolute values, the RSS measurements can be made either using dBm or RSSI units. Although
using dBm would provide better granularity and improve the chances of detecting abrupt changes
in RSS profile.
2) Experiments: Experiments were carried out in a lab environment using the experimental
setup described in Figure 1(a). A Pentium II PC with Netgear MA401 card, running linux hostap
driver on Redhat 9 was used as an AP (B). A laptop with Dlink DWL-650 card running linux
hostap driver on Redhat 9 was used as STA (A) and a Pentium II PC with Orinoco silver card,
running orinoco inbuilt driver on Redhat 9 was used as the attacker (C). A Linksys WRT54g
router with sveasoft firmware (Alchemy-pre5.3 v2.04.4.8sv) was used in RFMON mode as the
Monitor to passively observe the RSS values for A. The WRT54g provides RSS values in dBms.
Although the RSS technique can be used to monitor intrusions against both the AP and the
STA, however this experiment only deals with attack on STA A and only RSS values of STA
A are monitored.
Four different scenarios were studied to observe the effectiveness of RSS monitoring as an
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intrusion detection technique. In all scenarios AP B and the Monitor are stationary and the
Monitor is placed in very close proximity of the AP: (1) Scenario 1 - STA A is placed close to
the AP B at a point x; (2) Scenario 2 - STA A is placed far away from the AP B at a point y;
(3) Scenario 3 - STA A performs a round trip (at walking pace) from point x to y and back;
(4) Scenario 4 - STA A is stationary at point y and attacker C is stationary at point x; Attacker
launches a session hijacking attack against A. The attack was simulated by manually bringing
down A’s wireless interface and associating C with B using masqueraded MAC address of A.
For each scenario, 400 periodic RSS readings were taken for STA A by the Monitor, one
every second, and the results have been represented in graphs shown in Figure 2. In scenario
1, as point x is in very close proximity of the AP B, the difference between consecutive RSS
readings for A are very small i.e an average (avg.) difference of 0.005 with an avg. absolute
RSS reading of -28.9 dBm. In scenario 2, even though the individual absolute RSS readings
are quite different from those in scenario 1 (avg. absolute value of -88.89 dBm), note that the
difference between the readings remain almost same i.e. 0.003. In Scenario 3, the fluctuations
between consecutive RSS readings becomes more apparent. However the average difference is
still a low 0.07 with average absolute of -68.57 dBm. In scenario 4, a big fluctuation in readings
can be observed at about reading number 267. This is caused by the hijacking of A’s session by
the attacker C. The difference between observed RSS for C and the last observed RSS for A is
much larger (65) than values noticed during scenarios 1 to 3. Hence changes in RSS correctly
detected the intrusion, and displayed a low number of false positives as proved by low average
difference between consecutive RSS readings in scenarios 1 to 3.
B. Monitoring Round Trip Times of RTS-CTS Handshake
IEEE 802.11 uses both virtual and physical carrier sensing to monitor the state of the medium.
Every unicast frame uses its duration field to update the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) of
every node in range that receives the frame (wireless medium is broadcast). A node can only
transmit data when its NAV is zero. The NAV value reflects the predicted time (in microsec-
onds) it will take to transmit the frame from the sender to the receiver and the corresponding
acknowledgment (ACK) frame to return from the receiver to the sender. However another virtual
carrier sensing mechanism is used to mitigate collisions from hidden terminals that are not in
direct range of the sender and might start transmitting after incorrectly sensing the medium free.
Before starting transmission, the sender requests positive control over the medium by sending a
Request to Send (RTS) frame to the receiver. On receipt of the RTS frame, the receiver sends
a Clear to Send (CTS) frame as an acknowledgment back to the receiver. The duration field
in a RTS frame is large enough for the RTS-CTS handshake, the data frame and its associated
ACK frame. The duration field of CTS frame contains an updated duration value which takes in
account the time elapsed during the RTS-CTS handshake. All wireless nodes that receive either
the RTS or CTS frame update their NAVs and defer access to the medium.
Virtual carrier sensing ensures that the transmission of a data frame and receipt of its ACK from
the receiver is an atomic event, free from collisions. Morrison [10] proposed using this protocol
feature to calculate the distance between the sender and the receiver. If the sender monitors the
time taken for completion of a data-ACK round trip (Timedata−ACKrtt ) and knowing the speed
of RF waves in air (SpeedRF ), the sender can easily calculate the distance between itself and
the receiver using equation : Distance = SpeedRF × (Timedata−ACKrtt )/2. However the speed of
the RF waves vary considerably due to RF interferences and obstacles between the nodes and
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Fig. 2. Monitoring of RSS differences
the Timedata−ACKrtt needs to be very accurate and should not include various processing times
on both nodes and any carrier sensing backoff periods. Timedata−ACKrtt is also affected by the
length of the data frame. Given a fixed transmission rate, it takes longer to transmit bigger data
frames. These practical limitations might introduce errors in distance calculations.
This concept can also be extended to the RTS-CTS handshake scenario. Similar to the data-
ACK exchange between two nodes, the RTS-CTS handshake is also protected by virtual carrier
sensing. In fact RTS-CTS is used to establish the virtual carrier sensing for making the transmis-
sion of data frames possible without collisions. The successful receipt of the CTS frame from the
receiver indicates that the receiver successfully received the sender’s RTS frame and is ready for
receiving data. The sender can monitor the time taken for completion of the RTS-CTS handshake
between itself and the receiver i.e. Timertts . This is the total time taken for the RTS frame to
travel from the sender to the receiver and the CTS frame to be sent back as an acknowledgment.
RTS-CTS handshake is atomic and free from collisions with other wireless nodes. Hence the
only factors that affect the value of Timertts between two communicating nodes include 1) the
distance between the sender and the receiver, 2) the local environment around the nodes i.e. the
number of physical obstacles between the nodes and the number of reflections, refractions and
multipaths suffered by radio waves while travelling from sender to receiver and back and 3) the
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nature of radio equipment used by both the sender and the receiver. The size of RTS and CTS
frames is fixed and does not affect Timertts values for a fixed transmission rate. This makes
Timertts between two nodes an unspoofable parameter which cannot be easily guessed by an
adversary passively monitoring the airwaves. It is also protected from eavesdropping as it is a
property that is calculated by the sender of the RTS-CTS handshake. It is a measurement relative
to the entity measuring it and hence the adversary will have to be at exactly the same location
as the sender, using exactly the same radio equipment with same attenuation and antenna gain
and receiving the radio waves after same number of reflections and refractions as the sender
to exactly predict the values of Timertts between the sender and the receiver, as measured by
the sender. It can also be calculated without any significant computational overhead or waste of
bandwidth.
1) Discussion: From an intrusion detection perspective, rapid and abrupt changes in Timertts
between two nodes can be used as a mechanism to detect session hijacking attacks. Interestingly
this property still remains usable if rather than monitoring Timertts values on the sender, a
passive static wireless monitor is used for these time measurements. However the monitor can
not calculate Timertts in completeness as it is a property relative to the sender.
Monitor can only measure the time elapsed between when it first detected a RTS frame
from the sender to the receiver and when it detected a return CTS from the receiver back to
the sender i.e. Timerttm . For understanding this time can be roughly represented as Timerttm =
TimerttM - Time
rtt
s−r - Time
rtt
m−s where Timertts−r is the time it takes for a RTS frame to cover
distance between the sender and the monitor, Timerttm−s is the time it takes for a CTS frame
to cover distance between the monitor and the receiver and TimerttM is the actual time it takes
for the RTS-CTS handshake to complete between a sender and the receiver as observed by
the monitor (assuming somehow the monitor could measure it). In reality, the monitor has no
way of knowing actual values of TimerttM , Timertts−r or Timerttm−s. Monitoring observed Timerttm
values, at the monitor, presents a reliable passive detection mechanism for session hijacking
attacks as Timerttm is an unspoofable parameter relative to its measuring entity, which cannot
be guessed as its exact value depends on 1) the position of the receiver and the monitor, 2)
the distance between the monitor and the receiver and 3) the environment around the receiver
and the monitor. This is a property that cannot be measured or spoofed by an attacker passively
monitoring network traffic or using specialised radio equipment. We propose that changes in
Timerttm between two communicating nodes can be monitored per session by a passive monitor
and any abrupt fluctuations can be flagged as suspicious. This will help in detecting an adversary
who tries to take over a receiver’s session by forcing it off the network and spoofing its MAC
address. However to detect session hijacking attacks targeting the sender, RTS-CTS handshake
originating from the receiver will need to be used.
For example if legitimate station A has an established session with AP B, the passive monitor
calculates Timerttm for every RTS-CTS handshake from B to A and maintains it in a dynamic
profile that gets constantly updated per session. This profile is also only valid for the duration
of the session. If an attacker C takes over A’s session by spoofing its MAC address, the monitor
will notice change in Timerttm for A and will raise an alert. Timerttm values from RTS-CTS
handshakes between A and B, originating from A can also be registered by the monitor in A’s
profile to detect man-in-the-middle attacks against B.
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Fig. 3. Monitoring of RTT differences
2) Experiments: Experiments were carried out in a lab environment using the experimental
setup described in Figure 1(b). A Linksys WRT54g router with sveasoft firmware (Alchemy-
pre5.3 v2.04.4.8sv) was used as an AP. A laptop with Dlink DWL-650 card running linux hostap
driver on Redhat 9 was used as STA (A) and an Apple Powerbook running MAC OS X with
airport wireless card was used as the attacker (C). A Pentium II PC with Netgear MA401 card,
running linux hostap driver on Redhat 9 was used in RFMON mode as the passive Monitor
(ethereal was used for frame capturing). The WRT54g router’s RTSThreshold option was set to
1 (always on). This enabled RTS-CTS handshake for traffic from AP to STA.
Although passive monitoring Timerttm (RTT) values between two nodes (referred to a RTT
technique from hereon), can be used to monitor intrusions against both the AP and the STA, the
experimental setup only monitors RTT values of STA A. Four different scenarios (as described
in the previous section) were studied to observe the effectiveness of the RTT monitoring as an
intrusion detection technique. In all scenarios, AP B and the Monitor are stationary and the
Monitor is placed in close proximity to the AP.
For each scenario, 1000 RTS-CTS handshake events were captured and the results have been
represented in graphs shown in Figure 3. In scenario 1, the RTT absolute values are small
(avg=0.00023 ms, max=0.00083 ms ) and the RTT differences (diffs) range to max=0.000575
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with avg=8.1213e-05. However in scenario 2, the observed RTT values increment with distance
(max=0.0567 ms, avg=0.000643 ms) but the RTT diffs are still small figures (avg=0.000862,
max=0.0564). In scenario 3, the avg diff remains a small number with avg=0.0021 and max=0.5139
while the actual RTT measurements range from avg=0.0013 ms to max=0.5139 ms due to the
movement between x and y. In scenario 4, a large fluctuation in readings can be observed at
reading no 953. This is caused by the hijacking of A’s session by the attacker C. The difference
between observed RSS value for C and the last observed RSS value for A is much larger (4.7)
than any values noticed during scenarios 1 to 3. Hence RTT measurement correctly detected the
intrusion, and displayed a low number of false positives as proved by low average difference
between consecutive RTT readings in scenarios 1 to 3.
C. Deployment considerations
The techniques proposed do not require any modifications to the IEEE standards, AP or STA,
but do require the monitor to be deployed in close proximity to the AP, as it needs to be in range
of all signals transmitted. Additionally, the RTT measurement technique depends on the monitor
and AP remaining stationary (relative to each other). While RTS-CTS frames are not mandatory,
they are commonly used, for example in IEEE 802.11g networks that operate in IEEE 802.11b
compatibility mode.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The experiments presented in Section VI demonstrate the feasibility of using RSS and RTT
monitoring as wireless intrusion detection techniques. The techniques have been shown to be
effective and efficient, however the accuracy of the techniques depends upon the selection of
appropriate threshold values. If the threshold is set too low, a flood of false positives will result.
Similarly, selecting a threshold that is too high will lead to false negatives and the failure to
detect attacks. As a general guide, a site with very strict security requirements should use a low
threshold value and a non security sensitive deployment should consider using a larger threshold.
In isolation, RSS and RTT monitoring seems to work effectively against session hijacking
attacks where the attacker and the legitimate STA are geographically separated and the differences
in observed RSS and RTT between the attacker and the STA are significant. However, in cases
where the legitimate STA and the attacker are very close, it becomes necessary to not rely
completely on capabilities of just one technique, but rather enhance the confidence in the intrusion
detection process by correlating information from numerous sources. For example if a WIDS
registers a spike in observed RTT values for a STA, it can cross check the anomalous behaviour
with simultaneous changes in RTT for the same node for confirmation of the anomaly. This
would constrain the number of false negatives to a tolerable level.
From a psychological perspective, the attacker would tend to launch a session hijacking attack
from the safety of a remote location using a directional antenna, away from the STA. Hence
making it very easy for the RTT and RSS monitoring to pick up the noticeably significant
differences in the observed RSS and RTT values of the STA once the attack is initiated. To
further increase the degree of difficulty for the attacker in launching a session hijacking attack, a
co-operating distributed architecture can be deployed where multiple RTT and RTS monitoring
enabled WIDS units are deployed throughout the network. All the units report to a central control
authority where the correlation engine uses input from all the WIDS unit to make intrusion
decisions. This makes it much harder a job for the attacker to launch a session hijacking attack
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as they will have to guess and spoof RSS and RTT values of the legitimate STA as observed
by each WIDS monitoring unit. This will require the attacker to be at multiple locations at the
same time, hence making it almost impossible to launch an undetected attack.
Along with passive intrusion detection, some active measures also need to be developed
to address the unsuitability of using MAC addresses as identity token in wireless networks.
Lightweight authentication techniques like SOLA have been proposed to enhance per packet
authentication in wireless networks [14]. SOLA can authenticate every unicast frame and hence
can also be used to protect the vulnerable management and control frames against spoofing
attacks. Active intrusion prevention methods like SOLA, when used in combination with passive
intrusion detection techniques like RTS and RTT monitoring can significantly reduce the chances
of a successful attack.
For future work, we plan to explore benefits of using active intrusion prevention techniques
and passive intrusion detection techniques together in a WIDS in a real world environment. We
also plan to conduct more detailed investigations into the effects of a distributed co-operating
WIDS architecture on the effectiveness of RTT and RTS detection techniques in a real, larger
scale wireless network. We also aim to develop a standard test data set to validate findings of
the various planned experiments. Future work will also address methods to assist in calculation
of a suitable threshold values for both RTT and RTS detection techniques. Although this paper
focusses primarily on session hijacking detection techniques, however we also plan to look into
possible intrusion response techniques as continuation of this work.
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